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Abstract. Command and control systems centralize information from multiple
underlying systems to support operators in the performance of their mission.
Beyond the mission itself (that may be complex), operators must also ensure the
correct functioning of these systems (often called platform). Platform systems
(e.g. engines or electric system) may be very different from each other and
exhibit a large number of functional states. When applied to the design of
command control systems, User Centered Design methods support under-
standing and capturing operators’ needs to perform the mission, as well as to
propose solutions to design usable mission-related user interfaces. However,
user interfaces for platform management need to present and organize infor-
mation about the underlying complex systems. Understanding those systems and
abstracting away information about their behavior (so that operators can manage
them) requires deep knowledge beyond UI/UX designers and UCD methods
experts. In this paper, we propose a system-centered process that would com-
plement UCD approaches for the design of command and control systems. That
process takes as input the detailed functioning of underlying systems and pro-
vides abstract and structured information to inform UCD methods. Beyond
supporting usability property, the integrated process supports reliability and
safety properties that UCD approaches usually overlook. We present how the
proposed process has been applied for the design of a large civil commercial
aircraft warning system and show generalizability to other domains.
Keywords: Command and control systems  Development process  UCD 
Models  Architectures
1 Introduction
User Centered Design processes [26] target the design of usable interactive systems and 
promote the inclusion of real users in various development phases from early needs 
identiﬁcation and design until evaluation and deployment. Recent contributions have 
tried to classify and structure the various concepts underlying UCD and interaction
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design [28] as well as associating success criteria. For instance, interaction as trans-
mission focusses on the information passing between the user and the system and a
success criterion is the maximum efﬁciency for reaching a goal. Another example is
interaction as experience which focusses on the user feelings and on subjective
qualities perceived while interacting with the systems. While interaction as trans-
mission could be associated to early work in Human Factors [49] (and is referred to as
classical approach [42]), interaction as experience has received a lot of focus in recent
HCI research building on the seminal work from Hassenzahl [25] (and is referred to as
contemporary approach). While the classical approach was focusing on supporting
users’ work and avoiding the negative (such as user errors), the contemporary one
mainly targets at entertainment and leisure and focusses on the positive (such as
enjoyment and fun [7]). However, usability is still not trivial to reach for complex
command and control systems.
This evolution might be seen as migrating from a solved problem to a new difﬁcult
problem missing clear understanding and solutions. UCD approaches are flexible but
are still far from being adequate for the design and evaluation of command and control
systems in general, and critical ones in particular. For instance, cockpit design by
aircraft manufacturers and suppliers is performed jointly with Human Factors experts
(with a deep knowledge about operators’ tasks and environmental conditions) and test
pilots (with a deep knowledge about missions and platform systems) [45]. This is
required as command and control systems centralize information from multiple
underlying systems to support operators in the performance of their mission. Beyond
the mission itself (that may be complex), operators must also ensure the correct
functioning of these systems (often called platform). This does not mean engaging
repair activities but shutting down a faulty system or starting a redundant one [46]. The
systems gathered in the platform such as a cooling system, solar panels or engines
might be very different from each other an exhibit a large number of functional states
very speciﬁc to each system. When applied to the design of command and control
systems, User Centered Design methods support understanding and capturing opera-
tors’ needs, their goals and tasks [18] in order to perform their mission. In addition,
UCD approaches propose solutions to design usable user interfaces. However, when
dealing with command and control that supports activities dedicated to the management
of the platform, those user interfaces need to present and organize information from the
underlying complex systems. Understanding those systems and abstracting away
information about their behavior in order to allow operators to manage them, requires
deep system knowledge beyond UI/UX designers and UCD methods experts’ knowl-
edge. Beyond, the complexity of those systems require knowledge that cannot be
acquired by those UCD experts within the lifespan of the project.
As UCD approaches do not provide explicit support for building an abstract view
on the system and its services, we propose a system-centered process (that would
complement UCD approaches) dedicated to the design of command and control sys-
tems. That process takes as input the detailed functioning of underlying systems and
provides abstract and structured information to inform the UCD of command and
control systems. As UCD approaches target at improved usability, our integrated
process targets at feasibility as relevant additional and required property. That process
is also positioned with respect to regulations in command and control systems that
target at dependability and safety. Regulatory authorities build their certiﬁcation pro-
cesses on top of standards that vary signiﬁcantly from one domain to another. For
instance, ECSS target at space systems [15], ESARR at Air Trafﬁc Control [19] and
DO-178-C at Aeronautical systems [12]. Their integration within the design processes
is mandatory for critical systems and their explicit connection with UCD is thus
required when building dependable, safe and usable systems [29].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the limitations of UCD
approaches for command and control systems and motivations for extending UCD
them with deep knowledge about underlying systems. Section 3 presents a high-level
view of the proposed approach while Sect. 4 presents the foundations of the proposed
process. The main steps of the System Centered Design process are presented in
Sect. 5. Section 6 presents how the process has been applied for the design of a
commercial aircraft warning system and Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
2 Motivations: Why UCD Is Not Enough to Design C&C
Systems
The design of command and control systems requires information that is not provided
by UCD (e.g. all the possible states for each device). This section highlights the actual
conflicts between several principles of the UCD and the speciﬁcities of C&C systems.
2.1 Speciﬁcities of C&C Systems
The users who interact with C&C systems, named operators, interact according to
predetermined procedures, predetermined tasks and predetermined behaviors [47]. Their
abstract workflow [47] is to understand the system state, to compare it with the desired
system state and to apply the relevant procedure and tasks to achieve the target system
state. The number of possible states for devices and of information presented to the user
depend on the system and devices that compose the whole system. C&C systems aim at
managing large amount of system and devices, which leads to a huge number of possible
operational states to deal with. It is not possible for the users know all of these possible
states. In addition, the user will not be able to interact with all of the possible systems’
behaviors during the whole time s/he operates the system. For example, in the case of a
commercial aircraft, a ﬁre engine may happen one time out of one billion flight hours.
Most of the commercial airlines pilots’ will (fortunately) never have to interact with the
cockpit C&C interface to recover from an engine ﬁre. The design and development of
C&C systems are thus driven by safety and dependability objectives:
• Manufacturers of C&C systems have to set safety and dependability objectives for
their systems and have to demonstrate that the delivered systems match these
objectives [14]. Depending on the application domain and on the level of assurance
required for a function, regulation speciﬁcations let the manufacturer proves that the
targeted objective is reached using methods and techniques of its choice or indicates
prescriptive means of compliance to the requirements [14]. For high assurance
levels, structured development processes and model-based approaches are means of
compliance to the requirements.
• Manufacturers of C&C systems have to ensure that the C&C functions and inter-
faces match the users’ tasks [17]. For these purposes, Human factors experts
identify, gather and record exhaustively and precisely the users’ tasks [16, 47].
• The design of functions and presentations for C&C tasks is performed jointly with
Human Factors experts (with a deep knowledge about operators’ tasks and envi-
ronmental conditions) and test pilots (with a deep knowledge about missions and
extant systems) [45]. The produced design documents are shared amongst the
different stakeholders.
2.2 Main Principles of UCD and Their Limitations
User Centered Design is “a general term for a philosophy and methods which focus on
designing for and involving users in the design of computerized systems” [1] and has
the following main principles:
• Focus (early) on the user [22, 23], involve actively the user [11, 23, 31]: the user
and associated characteristics, tasks and context drive the design.
The operators have cumulative experience about the C&C systems they have been
operating, and about the systems’ behavior they have been interacting with. As far
as they know neither all the possible system’s states and all the systems’ charac-
teristics nor this information for the future systems, they do not have enough
knowledge to propose design solutions that contain relevant abstraction level and
relevant information. As UCD methods and techniques have historically been
proposed to deal with simple in home entertainment computers [5], it may be a
reason why this aspect is missing in UCD.
Moreover, focus (early) on the systems is required too. Exhaustive and detailed
information about each system is required before the design of the C&C interface.
For example, in the commercial aircrafts application domain, engines are speciﬁed
before the start of the cockpit design.
• Apply an iterative design process [11, 22, 31], apply an iterative and incremental
system development process [23]: the design process alternates the production of
multiple design solutions (evolvable prototypes) and their evaluation with users in
order to accommodate requirements changes and integrate new parts of the system.
An iterative and incremental process does not provide support to have a generic
architectural view on the system and of its various components [48]. Consequently,
it also makes very difﬁcult to demonstrate that the system reach objectives in terms
of levels of safety and dependability [48].
• Produce simple design representations [23]: The design solutions are represented in
a way that can be easily understood by all stakeholders.
The representations that provide support to C&C tasks have to contain the relevant
information concerning the systems’ characteristics and states. According to the
complexity of C&C systems as well as the amount of information dealt with [47],
the design representations cannot be as simple as mass-market systems design
representations.
• Perform empirical measurement [22], evaluate use in context [23]: User evaluations
are conducted throughout the iterative design process.
The recruitment of operators for user evaluation as well as the preparation and
implementation of the test sessions is constrained [41]. It is not possible to cover all
the operators’ tasks and procedures and several types of users must be involved at
the same time during the test sessions.
• Multi-disciplinary design teams [23, 31].
Several types of expertise are required (engineering, physics, human factors, soft-
ware, hardware…). Stakeholders bring their expertise. The produced design and
development artefacts are shared amongst the stakeholders.
2.3 Existing Approaches for Integrating UCD in System Development
Processes
The fact that UCD do not explicitly address the whole development process for an
interactive system has been acknowledged since decades [23, 33, 35]. From a system
and software engineering perspective, development processes such as the waterfall
process [43] and the V cycle process [36] have proven useful to reach safety and
dependability objectives (i.e. “to build the system right”) [8] but they fail in taking into
account the usability property (i.e. “to build the right system”) [8]. The Spiral [8] and
Agile processes [44], even if they are iterative, do not explicitly take into account user
needs and tasks [30]. To overcome these issues, Goränsson et al. [23] proposed a
design process centered on usability. Larusdottir et al. [30] proposed an approach to
integrate UX design activities in Agile development processes. Gross [24] proposes a
generic process based on the high level UCD phases and complemented with system
development phases in order to encourage system designers and developers with no
HCI background to apply UCD techniques. Martinie et al. [33] proposed a develop-
ment process for safety-critical interactive systems, taking into account the develop-
ment of the training program.
These existing approaches do not provide explicit guidance and support on how to
use systems design artefacts within UCD phases, although system design artefacts
provide the information required to identify what should be presented to the users and
to take into account the feasibility of the interface and interactions design solutions.
The existing approaches fail in taking into account the properties required for C&C
systems: feasibility, usability, dependability and safety.
3 Holistic View on Command and Control System
Development
Figure 1 presents a generic approach for taking into account the properties required for
C&C systems: feasibility, usability, dependability and safety. This generic approach
was designed and developed in collaboration with cockpit experts and engineers in the
aeronautics domain during a four-year project on aircraft operational systems’ states.
This approach, named the clover process covers these properties thanks to three
different sub-processes: The System Centered Design (SCD) process, the User Cen-
tered Design (UCD) process and the Regulator Centered Design (RCD) process.
The SCD process identiﬁes all the feasible command and control system functions.
Experts for each type of system should participate in this process. The aim of this
process is to provide information about the available command and control devices,
services and associated states by the mean of structuration and abstraction. This
information is composed of data, architecture, behavioral models and sample presen-
tation layout for the command and control system. This information thus feeds the
design and the evaluation phases in the UCD process. The foundations for the infor-
mation produced by the SCD process as well as the detailed phase by phase view on the
process (with the documents and information that flow between the phases) is described
in the next two sections of this paper.
The UCD process aims to ensure the usability property of the command and control
system and should then be conducted by usability experts. HCI main principles and
techniques can be applied but, as these activities require deep knowledge about the
command and control system, the UCD process has to take as an input the output of the
SCD process (data, models and sample presentation layouts of the systems, services
and associated states). For example, the task modeling activity requires the exhaustive
list of system functions, services and presentation information. If an important usability
issue that is due to the C&C system is identiﬁed, the design of the C&C system must be
amended (red dotted arrow from UCD to SCD in Fig. 1). In the same way, the outputs
of the UCD process can be regulated during the RCD process that may output pro-
posals for modiﬁcations (red dotted arrow from RCD to UCD in Fig. 1). System
devices or services can also be adapted by SCD (green arrows propagating modiﬁca-
tions from one process to another.
The RCD process aims to set dependability and safety properties and to verify
them. It should thus be conducted by safety experts. In the aircraft domain, the DO-
178C [12] standard deﬁnes development assurance level for systems of aircraft systems
and associated recommendations. In addition, the CS-25 [17] deﬁnes certiﬁcations
speciﬁcations and associated means of compliances for aircraft systems. Following
these means of compliances, manufacturers show to the certiﬁcation authorities that
they developed and deployed systems that conform to these speciﬁcations and standard.
A non-compliance leads to a new iteration of the UCD process or of the SCD process,
and then to a new iteration of the RCD process in order to verify that the compliance
issue is solved. For example, the CS-25 speciﬁes that aircraft systems have “to be
designed so that qualiﬁed flight-crew members trained in its use can safely perform
their tasks associated with its intended function” [17]. Then, in order to be accepted
during the RCD process, each identiﬁed user tasks (identiﬁed during the UCD process)
must match a system function (deﬁned during the SCD process with architecture and
data models) for the command and control system design. This highlights the impact of
dependability on usability [20].
4 Foundations for “Systems Centered Design” for Command
and Control Systems
The SCD outputs data about systems devices, services and their associated states. For
example, in a commercial aircraft, the “FUEL” service is associated to the aircraft fuel
systems (fuel tank, pump, cross-feed valves, etc.). In order to provide support for
covering all the possible devices, services and their associated states in the design
solutions for the C&C interfaces and interactions, we present: (1) an architecture built
upon the concept of abstraction hierarchy framework [6], and (2) a generic and abstract
state description applicable to the all of the architecture components (devices, services).
4.1 Handling Complexity with a Generic Architecture for the Command
and Control of Integrated System Services and Devices
DSCU (Device, System service, Compound service and User Service) is a generic
architecture designed around four types of components, each representing different
level of system abstraction for command and control. Figure 2 introduces the archi-
tecture. From left to right, it goes from physical implementation of the system (devices)
to services that are of interest for the end-user, named “User Service”. This decom-
position is close to the one proposed in the abstraction hierarchy framework [6] and
thus allow to reason on the entire system.
Fig. 1. The clover process for the design and development of command and control systems
(Color ﬁgure online)
System Devices. System devices are physical devices capable of producing or routing
resources (e.g. electrical generator and switches) and/or delivering forces (e.g. torque).
The System Device component (leftmost box in Fig. 2) holds the operational parameter
of the monitored device. On an aircraft engine, these parameters include the rotation
speed of the fans, the exhaust gas temperature, etc. These are useful to identify
problems such as over speed, overheating, etc.
System Service. System services are the set of resources and forces a device is capable
of producing. The System Service component (second box from the left in Fig. 2) holds
information regarding the production of the said resource or force, named “Service” for
generalization purpose. The System Services produced by an aircraft engine are, for
example, “Thrust” or “AC Electricity”. The System Service “Engine 1 AC Electricity”
holds information related to the monitoring of the Engine 1 generator such as output
Voltage or Current.
Devices dedicated to routing (e.g. electrical switches, fuel valves) enable system
services such as “Electricity routing” or “Fuel routing”.
Compound Service. A Compound Service is a system-wide resource made available
to devices and other services after aggregation from multiple producers. For example,
on a twin-engine aircraft, the “AC Electricity” compound service is the result of the
compounding of “Engine 1 AC Electricity”, “Engine 2 AC Electricity”, “Auxiliary
Power Unit AC Electricity” and “AC Electricity Routing”. “Compound Service” (third
box for the left in Fig. 2) are particular as their operational parameters may be nominal
even though some system services used to produce it are faulty. Indeed, in complex
systems, redundancy is an example of safety mechanism designed to prevent complete
loss of compound services. This means that even though a system service is not
working anymore (e.g. “Engine 1 AC Electricity”), the compound service to which it
participates (i.e. “AC Electricity”) may still be properly made available. The role of the
“Compound Service” is to allow for the identiﬁcation of such combination and their
proper monitoring.
User Service. A User Service (fourth box from the left in Fig. 2) is a service that is of
interest for the user, or in other word directly associated to his/her goal. It needs and
controls one or multiple “Compound Services” in order to be delivered. For example,
on an aircraft preparing for takeoff at night, the flight crew needs to dim the cabin light
in order to comply with safety procedure. In this case, “Cabin Light” is a user service
Fig. 2. Generic architecture for command and control of integrated system services and devices.
that principally relies on the “AC Electricity” compound service in order to be
delivered.
4.2 Handling State Explosion with a Generic and Abstract Systems
and Services States Description
OQCR is a generic state based framework designed to allow the description of the
status of devices and systems according to 4 variables. These variables were identiﬁed
by analyzing the existing synoptic pages and alerts on command and control systems.
The variables used in OQCR are:
• Operational State: Is the device/service on, off, powering on, etc.?
• Qualitative State: Is the device/service working properly? (e.g. is a battery
delivering sufﬁcient or insufﬁcient voltage? Is it dead?)
• Contextual Attribute: Is the device/service in a suitable environment for operating
properly? (e.g. is it within operating temperature range? Is it plugged to a suitable
electrical network (voltage, frequency)?
• Restrictive Attribute: Is it allowed to use the device/service?
The values these variables may receive are either boolean (for the attributes) or
extracted from a set of component-dependent values (for the states). The second line of
Table 1 details the size of each set of values the OQCR variables (ﬁrst line in Table 1)
may receive. This section presents (i) the sets of OQCR states and (ii) the sets of OQCR
attributes.
Operational and Qualitative States. In OQCR, the Operational and Qualitative states
are meant to provide real-time and predictive information regarding the behavior of the
devices and services. To do so, they indicate whether the device/service is in operation
(Operational state) and to which extant it is operating/it can operate properly (Quali-
tative State). Since DSCU covers a variety of components, slight variations in the
wording of the state values help to reflect the role of each component. Table 2 presents
the Operational states of OQCR.
Table 1. Structure of an OQCR state/attributes description.
Operational state Qualitative state Contextual attribute Restrictive attribute
1 value out of 4 1 value out 3 1 out of 2 1 out of 2
Table 2. OQCR Operational states for components of the DSCU architecture
Device System service Compound service User service
NOT RUNNING NOT PRODUCING NOT DELIVERING
STARTING RAMPING UP
RUNNING PRODUCING DELIVERING
SHUTING DOWN RAMPING DOWN
The values for the qualitative attributes are presented in Table 3. While the
Operational state is a real-time value only, we observe that the Qualitative state owns a
predictive value when a device/service is not running/producing/delivering. Indeed, it
may indicates that attempting the use the device/service will lead to either (1) the
expected behavior, (2) an unexpected behavior or (3) a failure to start due to a pre-
viously identiﬁed loss of the device/service.
Contextual and Restrictive Attributes. The OQCR Contextual and Restrictive
attributes are meant to provide information regarding the environment the
device/service evolves in (Contextual attribute) and how safe it is to use it (Restrictive
attribute). Table 4 presents and deﬁne the Contextual and the Restrictive attributes for
DSCU components. It is important to note that multiple factors such as resource
availability (e.g. low fuel pressure for an engine) or environment-related ranges (e.g.
temperature range, altitude range) impact the contextual attribute. The restrictive
attribute is the result of the computation of other system state that may forbid the usage
of a given device/service under some circumstances. (e.g. if a ventilation system is out
of service, it is not allowed to use the device it is meant to cool).
5 A Detailed Process for “System Centered Design”
of Command and Control Systems
The SCD process aims at structuring and abstracting the C&C systems’ descriptions
and states. This process uses the DSCU architecture to describe each system in a
structured way and the OQCR states abstraction for each component of the systems
described with the DSCU architecture. The outputs of this process are an integrated
Table 3. OQCR Qualitative states for components of the DSCU architecture
Device Services Deﬁnition
FUNCTIONAL The device can run or run properly. The service is (or can be)
produced/delivered as required
DEGRADED The device is not capable of running properly and suffers






The device is not capable to run. The service cannot be
produced or delivered
Table 4. OQCR attributes for components of the DSCU architecture.
Attribute Value Deﬁnition
Contextual WITHIN CONTEXT The device/service is in its nominal context of use
OUT OF CONTEXT The device/service is not in its nominal context of use
Restrictive ALLOWED The device/service can be use
NOT ALLOWED The device or service must not be in use
architecture of the systems, the behavioral models of the C&C system and sample
presentation layouts of devices and services states. HCI designers can use these arte-
facts during the UCD process to propose design solutions for the C&C user interface.
Figure 3 presents the System Centered Design process of C&C systems. The process
takes as input all the systems being under supervision of the extant command and
control system. The process steps are applied for each system one by one and the last
step consists in integrating the information produced for each system.
5.1 Data Collection
This step consists in collecting the extant information concerning the selected system.
Each system must have a well-speciﬁed documentation including speciﬁcation of
alarms, services, and operation and training manuals.
5.2 DSCU Generic Architecture and OCQR States Instantiation
During the second step, system designers analyze the selected system according to the
DSCU architecture. The designers have to identify the devices, the routing devices, the
system services, the compound services and the user services composing the selected
system. The speciﬁcation documentation on the services of the system and the oper-
ation and training manuals are used during this step.
This steps aims at identifying if a service is useful to enable another service or
system, and if a service is directly useful to reach a user goal. For example, in the case
of a commercial aircraft cockpit, if the pilot needs to perform a “climb” at the
beginning of the flight, then the service “climb” is a User Service. The operation and
training manual are helpful to understand the services utility for users’ tasks. The result
of this analysis is an instantiated DSCU architecture. The OQCR states provide an
abstraction of all the possible values of devices or services parameters (e.g. value of
speed or quantity) for this architecture. However, in some particular domain, speciﬁc
parameters may be important to abstract the device or service state. During this step,
the OQCR states (presented from Sect. 4.2) can thus be customized for a particular
device or service if needed for the application domain (an example of such cus-
tomization is presented in Sect. 6.1).
5.3 Unitary System Processing
The aim of this step is to detail the behaviour of each component of the instantiated
DSCU architecture. The description of the devices and services behaviour will be
useful during the UCD process to understand which events trigger a state change. In
order to achieve this, the designer must follow three sub steps described hereinafter.
Unitary Alarms Identiﬁcation. This sub step aims to assign each alarms of the
system to the DSCU components.
Fig. 3. System centered design of command and control systems
This assignment is the answer to the question “is the alarm affecting the system
device, routing device (or service), system service, compound service or user service?”
This step of alarm assignation is useful to determine in which conditions the device or
service under consideration is “DEGRADED”, “OUT OF ORDER/SERVICE”, “OUT
OF CONTEXT” or “NOT ALLOWED”.
Unitary System Modeling. This step consists in producing a description of the
behavior of the system following the DSCU instantiated architecture with alarms and
OQCR states in this sub step. The behavior of the device or service can be described
thank to various languages and notations like automata, Petri nets, or flow-based
notation. This model describes in which conditions and after which events the device or
service under consideration changes state.
Unitary Sample Presentation Layout Design. This step consists in producing sample
presentation layouts to help to understand the available services of the system and the
behavior of the system according to the alarms and user tasks. The sample layouts must
make visible all that is feasible with the system under consideration, as well as all the
possible states for the presented system components. Several different sample pre-
sentation layouts of the C&C interface for the system are produced in accordance with
operational scenarios. These different sample presentations will then be easier to use
during the UCD process as they are explicitly bound to scenarios. The operations and
training manuals contain procedures for nominal and abnormal situations taking into
account the system context. This is why they are useful resources for this sub step.
5.4 System Modeling and Sample Presentation Layouts Integration
The C&C interface must provide an integrated vision of the systems’ characteristics
and states. The last step of the SCD process is thus to integrate the outcome of the
previous steps for each processed system. The integration of the information about the
different systems can reveal new services or some introduced errors during the struc-
turation and abstraction process. Then, the expertise of the C&C systems’ experts is
needed to correctly identify the ﬁnal services of the integrated systems. This integration
step produces the ﬁnal integrated DSCU architecture, the ﬁnal integrated systems
models and the ﬁnals systems sample presentation layouts when every system of the
whole command and control system were processed.
6 Application of the System Centered Design Process
to an Interactive Cockpit Application
In this section, we present a summary of the result we obtained applying the SCD
process to the design of a future crew alerting system for large civil aircrafts. This work
was performed in collaboration with Airbus Operation SAS in a project called “Inte-
gration of the Cockpit and its Systems”. This project involved, at various level,
additional stakeholders such as Airbus Helicopters, Dassault Aviation and Thales
Avionics.
The commercial aircraft Airbus A350-900 is the system selected for the case study.
The following set of materials and documentation were used for the application of the
process:
• User-related materials such as the aircraft Flight Deck Brieﬁng for Pilots and its
Flight Crew Operation Manual (FCOM);
• Training materials such as the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM);
• Speciﬁcations of aircrafts systems such as logical datasheets for the Warning
System, system speciﬁcations, system requirements, etc.;
• Regulatory documentation including standard for software development in aero-
nautics [12], design assurance guidance for airborne systems [13] and Certiﬁcation
Speciﬁcation and Acceptable Means of Compliance for large aeroplanes [10].
During the ﬁrst quarter of the project, weekly meetings with a Cockpit Display
expert, and a Flight Warning Engineer were dedicated to the analysis of the input
materials and documentations. The Flight Warning System (FWS) aggregates data
from most aircraft systems, hence its development in close cooperation with experts of
aircraft systems providing input to the FWS. The next two months focused on a subset
of the aircraft systems: Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), Bleed, Electricity, Fire Protection
System (FPS) and Fuel. For each of these systems, we collected data from the docu-
mentation (5.1) and used this data to derive an architecture from DSCU (5.2). At this
point, we realized that the wording of OQCR states and attributes could be reﬁned for
each components of the architecture (5.2). A Flight Warning System expert then joined
the project to help us with step 5.3. The Flight Warning System expert contributed
largely to the integration step (5.4). We had several meetings with various stakeholders
to validate the outcome of each step. After each review, we recorded a list of modi-
ﬁcations and amendments of the architectures, models and presentation layouts. We
then validated the new versions of the architectures, the models and the presentation
layouts with engineers and experts before pursuing the project at a larger scale. This
section presents an extract of the application of the SCD process to the aircraft system:
Engines.
6.1 Example of the Application of the SCD Process to the Aircraft
Engines
Data Collection (step 5.1 in the Fig. 3). The documents gathered to understand the
functioning and the use of aircraft engines are:
• the speciﬁcation of the engines (sections concerning the behaviour, envelope, ser-
vices and needed resources) in the FCOM (Flight Crew Operation Manual) [2],
• the list of possible alarms for the engines and their associated recovery procedures
(FCOM too),
• the usage instructions with associated C&C interfaces screenshots in the FCOM and
the FCTM (Flight Crew Training Manual).
A screenshot of a possible state of the extant Command and Control (C&C)
interface for engines in an A350-900 cockpit is presented in Fig. 4. The information
presented is related to “ALL ENG FLAME OUT” (both engines stopped running)
alarm. This status of the engines can be derived from the display as:
1. the engines are indicated as failed (represented with the amber attention getting
boxes in left-hand side of Fig. 4) and
2. the vibrations of rotors are not updated anymore (represented with the “XX” amber
indications for the vibrations of rotors).
DSCU Generic Architecture and OQCR States Instantiation. (step 5.2 in Fig. 3)
DSCU Instantiated Architecture for Engines. Figure 5 presents the DSCU architecture
instantiated for the two engines of the Airbus A350-900. It includes two ENGines
System Devices (blue components of Fig. 5 labelled “ENG 1” and “ENG 2”). From the
speciﬁcation of the engines, we know that both engines produce HYDRaulic, BLEED,
ELECtricity and THRUST (i.e. force pushing forward) services. Then, both ENGines
produce a System Service for each of these services (green components connected to
ENG 1 and ENG 2 in Fig. 5 labelled “ENG 1 HYDR”, “ENG 1 BLEED”…). Com-
bined, ENG 1 and ENG 2 produce services corresponding to the merging of the
services of each Engine. These Compound Services (yellow components connected to
engines System Services in Fig. 5) include “THRUST” from “ENG 1 THRUST” and
“ENG 2 THRUST”, BLEED … Each service requires a routing device and a routing
service to be transported. In consequence, the DSCU architecture of the engines
includes a routing System Service for each Compound Services (components labelled
routing and network System Service components of Fig. 5: “ELEC NETWORK”,
“BLEED ROUTING”…).
In addition, the engines need a FUEL service for their operation. Then, the DSCU
architecture of engines includes a FUEL Compound Service as a resource for ENG to
function (FUEL Compound Service yellow component on the left-hand side of Fig. 5).
Fig. 4. Current ENGines System Display page after “ALL ENG FLAME OUT” alarm triggered
OQCR States Customization. During the analysis process, we found that the engines
may be in an unknown state when they have not been turned on yet. Indeed, we cannot
know its quality of operation state. In the same way, in case of a data update failure
from the systems to the C&C interface, the whole state of the system is unknown. In
consequence, we customized OQCR description by adding a value “UNKNOWN” that
applies to each OQCR state descriptor (O and Q) and each attribute (C and R).
Unitary System Processing. (step 5.3 in Fig. 3)
Unitary Alarms Identiﬁcation. The ENGines documentation contains all the alarms
that may occur with this system. The FCOM indicates 60 possible alarms for the
engines [2]. We present here two examples assignment of alarms to the components of
the DSCU architecture: the caution alarm “THRUST LOCKED” and the warning alarm
“ALL ENG FLAME OUT”. The “THRUST LOCKED” alarm indicates that the
THRUST is frozen for one or both ENGines. The concerned components in DSCU are
ENGines THRUSTs (green ENG 1 TRHUST and ENG 2 THRUST System Services
components in Fig. 5). The “ALL ENG FLAME OUT” alarm indicates that both
engines are shutdown during the flight, represented in DSCU by ENGines devices
(blue ENG 1 and ENG 2 System Devices components in Fig. 5).
Unitary System Modeling. We used ICO Petri nets [39] to describe the behaviour of
the engines. One of the reasons we choose ICO notation is its ability to scale that is
needed for the integration step. Beyond, this notation has been widely used in multiple
domain for describing interactive systems behaviours for cockpits [9] or Air Trafﬁc
Control Workstations [40]. As it is grounded on Petri nets theory, this notation is also
able to deal with concurrency and large number of states, beyond what State machines
can represent.
Fig. 5. Instantiated DSCU architecture for engines (Color ﬁgure online)
Unitary Sample Presentation Layout Design. To produce sample presentation layout
of engines states, we used the recommended recovery actions (for abnormal situations)
and normal checklists (for nominal situation) described in the FCOM [2].
Figure 6 presents one mockup of a presentation layout. It depicts the states of every
Compound Services of the engines when a “ALL ENG FLAME OUT” warning alarm
occurs. The mockup shows that, after the occurrence of that alarm, the ENGines
System Devices are in the operational state “NOT RUNNING”. All the Compound
Services are “OUT OF CONTEXT” (abnormal lack of resources). In addition, BLEED
and HYDraulic Compound Services are “RAMPING DOWN” as the ENGines stop
producing this services. The user service THRUST is “NOT DELIVERING” and the
engines are “NOT RUNNING”. The ELECtricity Compound Service is still “DELI-
VERING” thanks to an automatically turned on backup system for ELECtricity.
Finally, all the Compound Services are still “FUNCTIONAL” and have the restrictive
attribute “ALLOWED” because the warning concerns the ENGines System Devices
and that there are no restriction of usage in this context for these Compound Services.
System Modeling and Integrated Presentation Layouts. (step 5.4 in the Fig. 3)
Integrated DSCU Architecture. Together with the experts, we identiﬁed that THRUST
Compound Service produces the CLIMB User Service (used by the pilots during
takeoff for example). We thus integrated CLIMB User Service into the DSCU archi-
tecture as shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. A sample presentation layout of DSCU structuration and the OQCR states of the engines
Compound Services in case of ALL ENG FLAME OUT.
Fig. 7. Integration of CLIMB user service in the DSCU architecture of engines
Integrated Systems Models. During this sub step, we connected the model of the
behavior of the THRUST Compound Service to the model of the behavior of CLIMB
User Service. These behavioral models are not presented here due to space constraints.
The interested reader can ﬁnd similar models (covering nominal and abnormal situa-
tions in [21]).
C&C Sample Presentation Layout. Figure 8 presents a mockup of presentation layouts
produced for the “ALL ENGs FLAME OUT” alarm. In this layout, the ENG 1 and
ENG 2 System Devices are in the qualitative state DEGRADED because of the alarm.
In addition, they are in the operational state NOT RUNNING because the warning
alarm indicates that they are shutdown. All of the System Services related to the
ENGines (“ENGs ELEC”, “ENGs BLEED”, “ENGs HYDR” and “ENGs THRUST”)
have the contextual attribute OUT OF CONTEXT and they are in the operational state
RAMPING DOWN, except the THRUST System Service that is in the operational state
NOT PRODUCING. The CLIMB User Service is in the operational state
RAMPING DOWN and has the contextual attribute OUT OF CONTEXT. Indeed, the
THRUST resource is no longer produced and the plane will slowly start to glide.
Routing System Services are still PRODUCING (operational state) –FUNCTIONAL
(qualitative state) -WITHIN CONTEXT (contextual attribute) –ALLOWED (restrictive
attribute).
Fig. 8. A layout of the presentation for the system under design (following DSCU and OCQR).
6.2 Towards UCD of the Crew Alerting System
Each artefact produced during the application of the SCD process can be exploited by
most UCD techniques and methods. The set of DSCU architectures and the OQCR
(states and attributes) provides the exhaustive list of devices, services and their asso-
ciated states and attributes. This information provides support for designing mock-up
and prototypes of the interface of the C&C interactive systems. They also provide
support to crosscheck the prototypes and the task models, in order to determine whether
all the devices are bound to at least one user task. They also can be of great help
provide support to observation and interview activities as they help understanding
which services and devices are required for each user service (e.g. the connection
between the engines and climb in DSCU architecture represents explicitly the fact that
engines have to be functional to perform CLIMB). The system components behavioral
models provide additional support to deﬁne the behavior of mockups and prototypes
beyond their layouts. In the same ways, the coverage of both nominal and abnormal
situations provide support to produce prototypes that cover all the cases but also helps
identifying in an exhaustive way operators’ tasks [37] identifying corner cases to be
addressed in interviews and observations preparation. Furthermore, the system com-
ponents behavioral models provide support to the application of dependable computing
techniques [38], that provides means of compliance for the application of the RCD
process.
7 Conclusion and Perspectives
While UCD approaches focus on the usability of the interactive system under design,
constraints beyond users’ needs that have to be taken into account when designing
complex command and control systems. For instance, feasibility is a ﬁrst class citizen
but it is not addressed by UCD approaches. For instance, without a deep understanding
of aircrafts physics, it is not possible to design a cockpit that will meet feasibility.
Beyond, this paper has demonstrated that without a deep understanding of aircraft
systems, cockpit design is a task doomed to fail, especially when interfaces for system
management are concerned. However, it is not possible for designers to learn all this
information for every type of command and control system they are likely to design.
This paper tackles that speciﬁc problem by providing a generic design process for
gathering the information of underlying systems when designing a command and
control system. This process makes explicit use of available documentation (both
technical and operational) and provides stepwise progress towards User Centered
Design.
In this paper, the proposed approach is applied to the design of user interfaces for
aircraft cockpits. However, the approach is generic enough and applicable to other
command and control systems. For example, in the space domain, the satellite platforms
and the missions they support are ﬁrstly designed for feasibility. The design of ground
segment applications to monitor and control the various sets of devices of the satellites
and of the ground communications systems also requires knowledge beyond the UI/UX
designers and UCD experts’ knowledge [32]. The paper has also emphasized the
importance of standards and certiﬁcation activities in the design of these systems. Indeed,
even automotive systems rely on existing standards such as AUTOSAR [4] and ISO
26262 [27] that provide regulatory framework for autonomous cars design and devel-
opment. We believe that this paper can provide support to designers involved in design
tasks of C&C systems that have been so far not supported by UCD processes leaving,
very unfortunately, Command and Control interactive systems design incapable to
beneﬁt from UCD beneﬁts. Such approach requires techniques to trace and analyze the
coverage of regulatory requirements, feasibility requirements and design options [34].
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